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"Every Right to be Where She Was":
The Legal Reconstruction of Black SelfDefense in Jim Crow Florida
by Chris Bray
n a weekend night in Tampa in the late summer of 1919,
a twenty-three year-old black woman opened a knife and
slashed at the face of an eighteen year-old white man who
had pinned her to the floor of a streetcar with a hand around her
throat. Hattie Wright and Pierce Harwell were fighting over a seat
on the segregated car, but the details of the confrontation fit poorly into the usual narrative of the long movement for civil rights:
Wright was fighting to defend her segregated space at the back of
the streetcar, refusing Harwell's demand that she abandon the seat
next to him. Rather than locate other seating, she told him to
move to the section reserved for white passengers. Her demand,
and the resulting fight, quickly led to Wright's arrest. The trial and
legal appeal that followed left an extraordinarily rich documentary
record and painted a detailed picture of several intersecting social
worlds.' In particular, the case of Wkght v. State reveals the "hegeChris Bray is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of History at the University of
California Los Angeles. The author wishes to thank Andrew Macfarlane in Tampa
and Rita Roberts at Scripps College for their assistance. Stuart McConnell and
Andre Wakefield at Pitzer College, Fiona Halloran at Eastern Kentucky University
and Deirdre Cooper-Owens, Kim Hernandez and Me1 Lebe at UCLA provided
helpful comments on earlier drafts of the paper, and Ralph Luker provided very
helpful comments on a more recent draft. Jennifer Brathovde, of the Manuscripts
Division of the Library of Congress, offered generous assistance with the research
of this paper.
1. In a 1995 essay on earlier racial violence in Tampa, Jeffrey S. Adler discussed
the problem of sources regarding that topic: "Relatively few sources provide
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monic function of the law," places the uniquely multiethnic social
structure of the Tampa Bay region in its southern context, illustrates the conflict between overlapping systems of white supremacy, and shines a remarkable light on the daily choices of ordinary
people as they navigated a segregated landscape.
During the last fifteen years, historians have reconceptualized
a narrative in which the Civil Rights movement was the product of
a black "awakening" in the 1950s that then led to organized nonviolence. Such scholars as Robin D.G. Kelly, Timothy Tyson, and
Charles Payne have shown the long roots of black resistance to
white supremacy, foregrounding ordinary resistance and noting
the significance of violent self-defense. Focusing on the other side
of that narrative, legal historians Robert Cottrol and Raymond
Diamond have examined state efforts to facilitate white supremacist violence by disarming black citizens and rendering them
defenseless. "Jm Crow," they write, "was sustained by private v i e
lence, often with public assi~tance."~
More recently, Paul Ortiz
focused on black responses to racist political violence in Florida; in
that state as elsewhere, Ortiz writes, "the period after the fall of
Reconstruction was not characterized primarily by black acquiescence to Jim Crow or legal segregation, but rather by open struggles to fight racial oppression," including "acts of armed
self-defense against white supremacist vi~lence."~
In the newly

*

2.
3.
4.

detailed information on violent behavior. Coroner's records contain data on
homicides, though murder was-and is-an unusual and relatively infrequent
outcome of violent behavior...Police reports provide information on arrests for
low-level violence, but, typically, police blotters merely list names and offenses.
Similarly, court records often iden* only the name of the defendant and the
verdict..." See Adler's "Black Violence in the New South: Patterns of Conflict
in Late-Nineteenth-CenturyTampa," in David R. Colburn andJane L. Landers,
eds., llw Ajrncan Amaican Haituge of M (Gainesville: University Press of
Florida, 1995),209. A partial solution to this very real problem is found in the
records of the Florida Supreme Court. The file for each case heard on appeal
generally contains a complete trial transcript and a f
dl record of memoranda
filed by lawyers. Judging by the condition of the files and their absence from
footnotes in histories of Florida violence, they are a little-used resource.
Eugene Genovese described the "hegemonic function of the law" in Roll,
Jardun, Roll: The World the Slaves Made (New York: Vintage Books, 1976), pgs.
25 to 49.
Robert T. Cottrol and Raymond T. Diamond, "The Second Amendment:
Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration." Georgetown Law Journal (Dec.
1991):318-19.
Paul Ortiz, Emanci'pation Betrayed: The Hidden History of Black Organizing and
White Violence in Hmidu porn Reconstruction to the Bloody Election of 1920
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), xv.
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dominant narrative established by these historians, black resistance to white supremacy appeared in organized and individual
forms, violently and nonviolently, over a period of more than a
century following the end of chattel slavery in the United States.
Meanwhile, white-run legal institutions recognized the threat to
white power and worked to limit armed black se~f-defense.~
While these historiographic interventions were badly needed, they leave a sizable explanatory lacuna, and miss a significant
complication in the legal and social arenas. African American
resistance to domination and injustice was persistent, widespread, aggressive, and broadly reflective of the values of black
communities, but it was also substantially contained for a full century by the system of white supremacy. Although containment
was in significant part the product of mob violence, repressive
laws, and white control of the raw coercive power of the state,
another significant dynamic was also at work: the legal system in
southern states was able on some occasions to contain black
resistance by accommodating it within a framework that significantly narrowed or subverted its meaning. Hegemony existed
alongside power; black resistance was not simply crushed, but
could also be suffocated in the formal embrace of the state and
the social embrace of paternalist white elites. Challenged, white
supremacist social and political regimes utilized a range of available responses, and could attack, deflect, or absorb threats to the
Jim Crow order. In particular, the criminal justice system in
southern states sometimes directly validated armed black selfdefense, amving at formal conclusions that were helpful to state
purposes. One particularly significant conclusion posited that
black citizens had a moral right to violently defend segregated
space against white intrusion. Wright's case offers a revealing
example of this argument at work.
The record of Wright's trial and appeal also suggests the
social richness of the legal process, painting a vivid local picture
and placing that local reality in a larger context. Several groups
spoke: First, during the trial, black and white witnesses - including Wright and Harwell - told markedly different stories about
5.

The latter part of this narrative reflects conclusions about southern courts
that Gunnar Myrdal famously reached more than sixty years ago. See chapters
2426 in An American Dilemma (New York: Harper and Brothers, 19-44),particularly the first pages of chapter 26.
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the same events, illuminating some of the daily realities of race in
Tampa and its surrounding communities. Second, as the state
moved to send Wright to prison, government officers were
obliged to explain their intent in ways that revealed their harshly repressive personal views regarding race relations. Finally,
Wright's defense lawyers explained their own views of race relations, which were premised on a significantly different ideology
of white supremacy. Informal social assumptions came to light in
the formal setting of the legal justice system, as they were rendered explicit in appellate memoranda, courtroom oratory, and
legal outcomes.
An examination of Wright's journey through the legal system
leads to several conclusions that will be of interest to scholars of
Florida's social history. First, while the Tampa Bay region is often
seen as a southern community with exceptional race relations due
to the ethnic diversity of the cigarmaking industry, the record of
Wright's trial suggests the presence of some very familiar racial
dynamics. Tampa was an exceptional southern community, but it
remained a southern communi~.,the social division into stark categories of black and white could sometimes be a significant part of
lived experience. Many of the things that happened on a Tampa
streetcar in 1919 reflect events on Birmingham buses in the 1940s,
for example, and can be examined in the context of Robin D.G.
Kelley's scholarship on that subject. Second, the prevailing narrative about African Americans in early twentieth century Tampa
focuses on a rising class of black professionals and activists, arguing that they "would strive to build in their city a southern center
for resistance to the encroachments of Jim Crow racial discriminat i ~ n . "In~ this narrative, "feisty Black women joined husbands,
sons, and brothers in protest against white streetcar conductors,
police, and politicians."7Wright, a young woman who worked as a
laundress, lived outside these middle class networks of social
activism and community organization. In a remarkably complex
set of actions, she entered into an escalating public confrontation
with a white man, fought for her rights to public space, defended

6.
'7.

Canter Brown, Jr. and Larry Eugene Rivers, "'The Negroes are there to stay':
The Development of Tampa's African-American Community, 1891-1916,"
Sunland T d m w No. 29 (2005), 59-60.
Nancy k Hewitt, Southm Discomfort: W~ornen'sActivism in Tampa, M ,
1880s1920s (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2001). 142.
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herself against racist violence, and protected the Jim Crow seating
arrangement Her choices complicate the story historians tell
about her time and place.8
The complexity of Wright's choices also caused consternation
within the Jim Crow regime. For the white lawyers who argued in
favor of Wright's imprisonment on an overdrawn criminal charge,
the significant fact of the case was that a black defendant had
injured a white victim in an act of violence. Their idea of white
supremacy was founded on a premise of frank and direct repression, and violence was supposed to flow in only one direction. For
the prominent white lawyers who took Wright's side, on the other
hand, the significant facts of the case were that Pierce Harwell had
crossed the color line to sit in the wrong part of a streetcar, and
that Wright had been attacked after identlfylng the violation to
him? Their idea of white supremacy was founded in a distinctly
paternalistic notion of racial obligation. In legal briefs and courtroom argument, an irony emerges: Defending herself against violent attack and personal degradation, Hattie Wright had policed a
racial boundary, a fact her white defenders would distort and celebrate while asserting her legal right to self-defense. Harwell, the
reasoning went, had interfered with the unfettered segregation
that black citizens like Wright were entitled to enjoy in peace, however much whites might wish to intrude upon it.
While the facts of Hattie Wright's fight and arrest were sharply
contested, it is possible to outline the event reliably. On a
September night late in the Red Summer of 1919,Wright boarded

8.

9.

While Wright's actions present only a single example, her fight with Harwell
also complicates our understanding of race and gender in Jim Crow Tampa.
In his essay on an earlier period, Adler concludes that violence "committed
by black women" against men "rarely crossed racial lines." See Adler's "Black
Violence in the New South," 223. One other partially comparable example is
available: A 1905 incident in which a black woman on a streetcar took a seat
a white man had given up "to accommodate some white women who had just
gotten on the car." The man struck the woman in the face, and was later fined
five dollars for doing so. The woman was fined $2.50. See, e-g., Kyle S. Van
Landingham, In Pursuit ofJustice: Law and Lawyers in Hikborough County, 18461996 (Tampa: Hillsborough County Bar Association, 1996), 41-2. This case
differs significantly from Wright's, as the woman involved in the altercation
was not fighting to maintain segregated space. For a brief and useful outline
of segregation on Tampa streetcars, as well as African American resistance to
that segregation, see Hewitt's S o u t h Discomfort, 14247.
I will discuss the exceptionally significant identity of Wright's lawyers later in
this paper.
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a Tampa streetcar. She carried a few dollars in cash and a folded
pocket knife, both rolled inside a handkerchief. Wright took one
of the two seats available to her on the segregated car, an outside
seat in the second row from the back. The inside seat next to her
was already occupied by Pierce Harwell, an eighteen year-old white
man, who immediately told Wright to stand up and move elsewhere. She refused, and told him to "go up front where he
belonged," to one of the seats reserved for white passengers.
Following that exchange, Harwell probably threatened Wright,
and he may have drawn a knife. But he certainly pushed her,
knocking Wright to the floor in the aisle. Defiant, she stood and
returned to her seat. Harwell again pushed her out of the seat, and
she again tried to return to it. Harwell pushed Wright a third time;
this time, however, he followed her to the floor, beating her in the
face with a clenched fist and choking her with his other hand. At
that point, pinned to the floor and afraid that she would be killed,
Hattie Wright shook the knife out of her handkerchief and
opened the blade. She cut Harwell, as he would later tell a jury,
"four times on the face and once over the heart and three times on
the shoulder," stopping only when he was dragged free by the
streetcar driver.I0
Beyond this broad outline, the incident between Wright and
Harwell is impossible to reconstruct precisely, as the details
changed with every telling. A newspaper account first presented it
as a knife fight, with Wright cut "slightly on the hand" and Harwell
taken to the hospital to receive "seventy-five stitches" to wounds
that were 'long and ugly but not serious." Harwell's unnamed
father denied that his son had used a knife, and claimed in an
interview that Wright had cut the young man on the face suddenly and without provocation. Wright was taken to the city jail by a
motorcycle officer while Harwell was taken to the hospital, but
both were initially charged with crimes. According to the Morning
Tribune, "The woman is charged with assault with a deadly weapon

10. Hattie Wrght v. Stah of Fhida, "Transcriptof Record,"Florida State Archives
(Series 49, Box 3086), 39 and 5. The order of parties in the case name reflects
Wright's position as appellant; the case in the trial court was State v. Wrght.
The Tampa Daily Times would report on Monday that Harweli had appeared
in court with his face "socovered with bandages and surgeon's tape that only
his eyes and part of a cheek was visible."See "Boy is Badly Cut by Woman," 8
September 1919, pg. 7.
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and the man with fighting."" The next day the local newspap
reported that both Harwell and Wright had been "turned over
the state" after a brief hearing in police court, though "Hamell was
released from custody, and the woman's bond
the case to be tried at the next term of the
court."12A fight had become an assault.13 .
It is also difficult to determine precisely when the fight took
place.14 Filing charges with the clerk of the Hillsborough County
Court, prosecutor Robert E. Lee Chancey-a future three-term
Tampa mayor-alleged that Wright had attacked Harwell "on
the sixth day of September," a Saturday night.15 But the state's
first witness, Harwell, told the jury that he was attacked on
September 9-a Tuesday, and the day the second story on the
streetcar fight appeared? During cross-examination, Harwell
said he was attacked on a Sunday night, which would have been
September 7. l7 Other witnesses all identified the
incident as September 6, but local newspapers
Monday, September 8 that the fight had occurred
I ,

11. "Negress Cuts White Man Several Times in Street Car
September 1919,4.
12. "Negress Held Under a $250 Bond for Fight," Tampa
September 1919, 5. The case remained an item of mi
TTibune; see the second and third paragraphs of the story titled "Not Guilty
Verdict in the Puleo Trial," on page 5 of the 25 October 1919 edition, and
"Jury Finds Wright Girl Guilty but New Trial Wd be Sought,"on page 5B of ",
the 26 October 1919 edition.
13. Harwell's knife would reappear only in Wright's courtroom testimony. No other witness testified that he had possessed or used a knife. Asked if he had
"anything to cut her with," Harwell said no. Wright's testimony about ,
Hamell's knife is dubious, starting with the unlikely claim that she saw him ' .
open the blade in his seat before she attempted to sit down next to her again. ;
Then, she said, he began to punch her with the hand that held the knife.
Asked, for clarification, if Harwe11 was hitting her with the hand that held the knife, Wright responded weakly, "He had the knife, but what become of the
knife I don't know." See Wright v. State, "Transcript of Record," 3840 and 46.
The arrest report would clarify the answer, but is not available. Email message
to author from Linda Giguere, records supervisor, Tampa Police
Department, 5 September 2008.
15. Wright v. State, "Transcript of Record," 1.
16. Ibid, 5.
17. Ibid, 6 and 10.
18. Ibid, see the testimony of Hazel Mason on 22, the testimony of Phillip ',
Montana on 26, the testimony of Mangeline McCray on 29, the testimony of , , .
MilesJohnson on 34, and the testimony of Hattie Wright on 38. The newspa- '
per stories, Op. cit., were "Negress Cuts White Man,"Mming Tribune, and
"Boy is Badly Cut by Woman," Daily T i m . The sloppy Daily Times coverage is

-,
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Since the charge, and most witness testimony, put the fight on
the night of Saturday, September 6, that seems most likely to be
the correct date.lg
The date matters because of the context it creates. For
Harwell, a dairy worker, and Wright, a laundress, Saturday night
would likely have been a highly charged social moment before a
day off from work.20In his examination of Birmingham's public
transportation system during World War 11, Robin Kelley notes
that "racial conflicts on Friday and Saturday nights were comm ~ n . " ~Harwell
l
testified that he was on the streetcar after
spending the evening "talking to some boys" for a couple of
hours. Wright testified that a friend had been visiting her, and
she was returning home after riding to her friend's house to
keep her company on the trip. The witnesses who were asked
about their activities told much the same stories about the
evening. W.B. Crowbory, a cigar maker, was on the streetcar
because he " j t took a ride." Mangeline McCray was visiting her
sister-in-law, who was sick.22It was, in short, a social weekend
night, one of the moments in which spontaneous racial conflict
was most likely to occur.23
If a Saturday night was one of the most likely moments for
sudden racial violence to occur, the summer of 1919 was one of
the most likely historical moments for such a conflict. In the

19.

20.

21.

22.
23.

of limited use to historians; that newspaper identified the defendant as
"Mattie Wright, middle aged negress."
In Wrigfrt v. State, "Transcript of Record," see the testimony of Pierce Harwell,
6 and 10. No other witnesses were asked to specify the time of the fight, but
testimony consistently described it as having taken place at night. See, for
example, the testimony of W.E. Crowbory on page 12.
Regarding Wright's employment, see her testimony, Wight v. State, 39.
Harwell was not asked in court to identifyhis occupation or employer, but the
Monzing Tribuneidentified him as an employee of the Tampa Dairy Company.
See "Negress Cuts White Man," Op. cit.
Robin D.G. Kelley, Race &€MIS: Culture, Politics, and the Black Wmking C h s
(New York: Free Press, 1996),49.
Wright v. State, "Transcript of Record," see Harwell's testimony, 10. Also
see Wright's testimony, 44, Crowbory's testimony, 18, and McCray's testimony, 34.
Curiously, only one witness at the trial,W.B. Crowbory, was asked if he had
been drinking. See UFnght v. State, 18. Florida was legally a dry state by 1918,
but the prohibition of alcohol worked as well there as it did in most places.
See John J. Guthrie, Jr., Keepers ofthe S'Tits: TheJudicdal ll'esto hhibition
Enfo~mnmtin l%nih,1885-1935 (Westport:Greenwood Press, 1998),especially chapter one.
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days surrounding the fight between Wright and Harwell, the
pages of the Tampa Morning Tribune routinely carried matter-offact reports of racial violence, with headlines that yawned at
extraordinary brutality. "Negro Lynched for the Usual Cause"
was the headline on a one-paragraph report from Louisiana,
buried under the commodity prices on page fifteen of the
Sunday paper.24 A front-page story from Jacksonville on
September 8, "Negroes Lynched and Their Bodies Dragged
Through City Streets," was followed by a short piece on page
~~
two the next day, "Jacksonville Quiet after its ~ y n c h i n g . "The
first page of the same issue reported on an incident in Memphis
in which two men were almost murdered by a mob. The mob
tried to lynch a black man who had struck four white children
with his car before a white bystander interfered, and begged the
crowd to let the criminal justice system do its job. As reported
by the Tampa newspaper, "The crowd's anger turned against
the white man, and when the police arrived, they say, the rope
was being transferred to his neck."26 Racial violence stood in
the social foreground, .with places and roles sharply prescribed.27
It is within this context that Hattie Wright boarded a Tampa
streetcar at the corner of Nebraska Avenue and Henderson
Avenue, walking to the back and sitting next to Pierce Harwell.
At trial, Wright testified that Harwell told her to "get up from by
me," then followed up with, "God Dam [sic] you, didn't I tell you
to get up from by me." Pushed to the floor, she returned, and
told Harwell, "you know these two seats are for colored people,
and there is plenty in front for you to sit in." As Wright recalled,

24. "Negro Lynched for the Usual Cause," Minning Tribune,'7 September 1919,
15.
25. "Negroes Lynched and Their Bodies Dragged Through City Streets," 8
Septemberl919, 1, and "Jcksonville w e t after its Lynching," 9 September
1919,2 in Morning Tribune
26. "Memphis Crowd Tries to Lynch Pair after Auto Hits Children," Morning
Tribune, 9 September 1919,l.
27. A brief outline of daily living conditions for black Tampa residents in this
period may be found in Walter T. Howard and Virginia M. Howard, "Family,
Religion, and Education: A Profile of African-American Life in Tampa,
~lorida,19001930,"TheJ o u d ofNigm History, Vol. 71, No. 1 (W~nter,1994),
1-1'7.See also Canter Brown and Larry Eugene Rivers, "The nemoes are there
to stay."
qmv4
T~{!!I~

W"'
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Harwell responded with, "God Dam [sic] you, if you don't get up
I will bloody your face."28Under cross-examination by one of
Wright's lawyers, Harwell remembered the exchange far differently, directly denying that he had threatened to "bloody" her.
The total number of threats he had directed against her, he
insisted, had been "None at all."29 But Harwell agreed that
Wright had told him to move to the section of the car reserved
for white passengers: "I asked her to move and she said 'move
yourself to the front of the car where you belong' and she swore
at me." Harwell did not concede that Wright had pointed out a
clear rationale for her demand, "there is a vacant seat you can
take and I can't."30In testimony, the defendant and her purported victim shared only the recollection that she had insisted upon
her right to a seat in the "colored" section, and had tried to
direct Harwell to the section reserved for white passengers. While
Wright's choice demands careful examination, the significance
of their testimony was clear. Both agreed that she had defended
the color line.
Testimony from other passengers on the streetcar fit the
rough outline of the story told by Wright and Harwell, but the differences are much more telling than the similarities. The seat
across the aisle fiom Harwell was also occupied by a white man,
W.B. Crowbory, who had a close view of the entire fight.31 In
Crowbory's telling, Harwell asked Wright to move, then told her
he would push her if she did not. She responded to his request
with, "these seats are for colored people," and then responded to
his threat by telling him to go ahead and push. Harwell did just
that. He further recalled that Wright first cut Harwell while she
was standing, not after she was on the ground with Harwell on top
of her. As he put it, she was pushed three times, and that was
"when she come back. The third time she come back cutting."32
Wright ended up on the floor, and Harwell ended up on top of
her, although Crowbory "didn't notice whether he hit her or not,"

28. Wright v. State, "Transcriptof Record,"38. Spelling is as it appears in excerpts
from the trial transcript.
29. Ibid, 8.
30. Wright v. State, "Transcriptof Record," 8.
31. Regarding Crowbory, see the testimony of Hazel Mason in Wright v. State, 24.
See also Crowbory's statements about his position on pages 18 and 19.
32. Ibid, 1415.
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and would allow only that Harwell "got out in the aisle some kind
of way."33
Remarkably, Crowbory insisted that Harwell had done nothing
while atop Wright in the aisle. Wright's lawyer, incredulous, pursued the question at great length during Crowbory's crossexamination. He repeatedly asked the same question in varying
forms ("You are positive of that?"), and the witness denied eight
times that Harwell had ever grabbed Wright by the throat. Despite
his untenable testimony, the trial transcript presents Crowbory as
a sympathetic figure placed in circumstances he would have
wished to avoid. Asked why he had not intervened to stop Wright's
supposed attack on Harwell, for example, he sensibly answered, "I
don't grab no knife." Significantly, Harwell himself contradicted
Crowbory with regard to one point. While maintaining that he had
not hit Wright until she cut him, he nevertheless acknowledged
that he had grabbed her by the throates5
Black witnesses called by the defense presented an entirely different set of details. Phillip Montana was standing at the back of
the streetcar when he saw Wright "fussing with this white boy." As
Montana recalled, Wright told Harwell that there were "plenty of
white folks seats up there." That observation drew the response,
"you damned nigger if you set down here I am going to punch you
in the face? Other witnesses from the back of the streetcar
caught only pieces of the exchange, hearing everything but
Harwell's most serious threat to strike or bloody the woman seated
next to him. Mangeline McCray heard Wright tell Harwell that the
seats up front "were the proper seats for him," heard her tell him
to "go up in front where the white folks belonged," and heard
Harwell say that he would push her. But during the rest of the
exchange, she only recalled that Hamell "kept mumbling somethingeV3'Miles Johnson, who was seated directly behind Harwell
and Wright, testified that the two "went to talking," but added that
he "couldn't tell what they said."38The personal conflict the individual witnesses experienced is palpable. They heard everything

"

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Ibid, 19.
Ibid, 19-20.
Ibid, 9.
Ibid, 26.
Ibid, 30.
Ibid, 35.
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but the most critical parts, suggesting the reluctance of people
dragged into someone else's fight-particularly given the fact that
it was an interracial fight.
The one thing noticed by every one of the black witnesses,
however, was that Harwell had been cut only after attacking
Wright. Mason testified that "he hit her and she hit him with her
fist, and he grabbed her by the throat and threw her across the seat
and down between the seats and got on top of her and was choking her," after which 'she had a knife in her hand and I saw the
blood coming over his face."3gMcCray testified that 'he fell over
her and had her by the throat and with his other hand he hit her,
and she commenced hitting up in his face and the blood was coming."40 Asked when he had first seen blood, Johnson replied,
'When he had her down and had his hand on her throat and was
beating her with the other hand, and then I saw her hand come up
and then I saw the blood."41aestioned by her lawyer, Wright herself repeatedly explained her decision to use the knife, saying that
she cut him "To keep him from choking me to death."
A few moments later, Wright and her lawyer returned to the
question in a brief and plain exchange:

Q. When was the first time you cut him?
A. When he had me down on the floor and was choking
me.
Q. What was your position when you cut at him from the
floor?
A. I was flat on my back and he was on top of me beating
me in the face and choking me."
Denied only by Crowbory but acknowledged finally by Harwell
himself, the fact is beyond dispute: Wright used her knife in a fight
with a man who put his hand around her throat.
Beyond the basic facts of the fight, two extraordinarily vivid
details emerge in the testimony, both touching on the realities of
race and gender not only in Tampa but also more broadly in the
Jim Crow South. First, events on the streetcar demonstrated the
oftentimes gendered nature of conflict on public transportation.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Ibid, 22-3.
Ibid, 30. See also 52: "Q.He had her with one hand by the throat?A. Yes sir."
Ibid, 35.
Ibid, 38-9.
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In a cogent chapter describing racial animus on Birmingham
public camers during the 1940s, Robin Kelley shows that baa
women's resistance to unfair or degrading behavior on city b
"tended to be profane and militant," while "fights between b
women and white passengers were also fairly common."" W
black women were the most likely passengers to resist racist pra
tices on public transportation,white men were the most likely ps
sengers to police social boundaries, and "a trangressive a
frequently led to violence."44 This dynami* between black womc
and white men is, with considerable irony, at the center of the
conflict between Wright and Harwell. Testimony in the case clearly established that white men occupied both sides of an entire row
in a two-row section for black passengers.45Both had empty seats
next to them. One of the black passengers, Phillip Montana, testified that he boarded the streetcar behind Hattie Wright, then
"went to the back part and stood
Whereas Wright took a
seat next to a white man and fought to keep it, Montana passed
an empty seat next to another white man in order to stand at the
back. Another black passenger, Miles Johnson, was unable to
describe the aftermath of the fight, testlfylng that he left the
streetcar at the first possible moment: "As soon as it stopped I got
off."" Montana and Johnson were anxious to avoid conflict, while
Wright met conflict and escalated it. Black men generally faced
far higher stakes in conflicts with white men, although Harwell's
response to Wright demonstrates that resistance was also dangerous for black women. The testimony paints a stark picture of
racial conflict: the sudden shock of violence with a black woman
at the center of the circle of strife, while around the edges of the
circle, black men urgently break free from the threat that they

43. Kelley, Race Rebels, 68. The phrase "congestedterrain" is the title of Kelley's
chapter on public transportation. See also Ortiz, Emam$ation Betrayed, 11925, for a discussion of organized streetcar boycotts that ends with a few
instances of individual resistance. Significantly, the individual acts of resistance on streetcars described by Ortiz all involved black women. Compare
these historical conclusions to that of Jeffrey Adler, footnote 8. It should be
noted that timing may explain the difference between conclusions, as Adler
was discussing an earlier period.
44. Kelley, Race Rebels, 58.
45. See e.g. Wright v. State, "Transcriptof Record,"19 and 24.
46. Ibid, 26.
47. Ibid, 37.
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might be pulled into the fight.* The threat to Wright was spontaneous violence; the more serious threat to Montana and Johnson
was the organized violence that could have followed their involvement in a fight with a white man.
Wright's lawyer defended his client by trying to turn the
tables, effectively bringing Hanvell to trial on a social charge of
crossing the color line. For the state, Hanvell's choices were never
an issue, and the prosecution's questions suggest a sense of entitlement and indulgence expected for white men. After the usual
opening questions about name, age, and place of residence,
Prosecutor Robert E. Lee Chancey lobbed this statement at
Harwell in the form of a question: "She is charged on having
made an assault on you with a knife. Go ahead and tell the jury all
you know about it?"" The cross-examination of Harwell by the
defense, on the other hand, quickly focused on his overlapping
identities as a Tampa resident and a southern man. Wright's
lawyer asked Hanvell how long he had lived in Tampa and where
he had lived previously, before he got to the real point: "Where
were you raised?" Eliciting the response that Harwell had been
raised in Alabama, the defense circled back to ask again about the
year he had lived in Tampa, and the ten years he had lived in
Florida. His purpose is clear: to establish for the jury that Harwell
was born and raised in the South, would have been familiar with
southern customs, and has lived in Florida long enough to know
the local variations on regional social rules.
Having established his familiarity with regional customs,
Wright's lawyer asked Hanvell if he was "accustomed to riding in
street cars in Tampa," and Harwell conceded that he was. Asked
repeatedly if he knew "the rule in Tampa that the two rear seats in
street cars are reserved for colored people," however, Harwell
responded with an answer that surely impugned his credibility
before a jury of other white men: "I do not know the rules."
Wright's lawyer hammered at the point, and Harwell quickly
48. While both white men and black men were lynched in Tampa in the late-nineteenth and early twentieth century, women were not among the local victims
of that deadly act. See Robert P. Ingalls, "Lynching and Establishment
Violence in Tampa, 1858-1935," TheJwmaZ of Southern Hishny, Vol. LIII, No.
4 (Nov. 1987), 613, passim; see also Ingalls' Udwn Vigilantes in the Neu South:
Tampa, 1882-1936 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1988), 183-84,
passim
49. Wright v. State, "Transcriptof Record,"4.
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offered a tacit admission that he had lied. Question: "Don't you
know it is a rule or custom in Tampa that negroes [sic] are not permitted to sit anywhere except on the rear two seats?"5oAnswer: "Yes
sir." With that concession, the defense asked Harwell where he had
been sitting. His testimony crumbling, Harwell answered weakly
that he had been seated in the "second or third seat from the
back."51 His cross-examination ended a very short time later.
A great deal has happened here that warrants examination.
Harwell, established to be a lifelong southerner, is led into the
transparently absurd claim that he does not "know the rules" about
race. A moment later, he gives up that untenable claim, acknowledging with a simple "yes sir" that he actually does. Trapped, he
sees the significance of the next question and makes a weak
attempt to dodge it with his purported inability to recall whether
he was sitting in the second row from the back or in the third row.
A southern white man in front of a jury of southern white men in
1919, he claims to have forgotten his choice of seating in relation
to the color line. The transcript is sadly mute on the reaction in
the courtroom. In any event, the next witness-Crowbory, a white
man testifying on behalf of the state-remembered Harwell's
place for him. Asked by the prosecutor for Harwell's location on
the streetcar, Crowboiy answered simply that he had been in "the
second seat from the rear on the right hand side."52Before the
state had finished making its case, Hanvell was revealed to have
transgressed the color line. Worse, the jury had watched him try to
talk his way around having done so.
With the victim and principal witness in his case discredited,
the prosecutor turned in his closing statement to a reframing of
the issues before the court. Chancey had accused Wright of
launching an attack with a "premeditated design to effect the
death of one Pierce Harwell," filing charges of "Assault with intent
to commit murder in the first degree."53The charge required the

50. Florida streetcars were segregated by state law, not merely by "custom" or
streetcar rules. See August Meier and Elliott Rudwick, "The Boycott
MovementAg;imstJim Crow Streetcars in the South, 1900-1906, TheJournal of
Arnaican History, Vol. 55, No. 4 (Mar., 1969), pg. 757, passim
51. W%ht v. State, "Transcript of Record," 67. Wright's lawyer returned to the
question of the color line with other witnesses. See e.g. the testimony of Hazel
Mason on 23.
52. Ibid, 13.
53. Ibid, 1 and 4.
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state to prove that Wright had previously hatched a plan to kill
Harwell and sought him out in order to bring her plan to fruition.
Having filed that charge, Chancey made a closing statement that
entirely undercut it, presenting Wright's actions as an instance of
selfdefense that she had no right to undertake. Wright had taken
a seat next to Harwell, he said, and Harwell had told her to move.
In those circumstances, Chancey concluded, "he had a right to
make her get up." Wright's lawyer objected to Chancey's statement, and the judge responded only that he would "instruct the
jury as to the law governing the case." Permitted to continue,
Chancey finished his point. "I argue as law," he said, "that if he was
sitting down there and she come and sit by him and he objected to
it; that she is not free of fault and can't invoke the law of selfdefense."" right's lawyer again noted his objection to that line of
argument, again without a response from the judge. And so the
state, having charged Wright with making a premeditated attack,
finished by telling thejury that she had not possessed a legal right
to defend herself, because she had caused Harwell to attack her.
The case against Wright had dissolved into a puddle of contradiction and dishonesty.
Judge William S. Graham read out a long and sober set of
instructions to the jury, describing a range of charges on which
they could convict. While Wright was charged with assault with
intent to commit murder in the first degree,jurors were advised
that they could convict Wright on that charge or any one of six
others, ranging down to simple assault. The judge also explained
they could acquit Wright on the grounds that she had cut Harwell
in an act of justifiable self-defense: "If you find from the evidence,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that this defendant cut this man, but
at the time she did so she was acting in self-defense...it will be
your duty to acquit her." Underlining the absurdity of the charge
were the jury instructions proposed by Wright's lawyer and read
aloud by the judge. Addressing the clash between the state's
premise that Wright had a premeditated intent to murder Harwell
and the prosecutor's argument that she had undertaken an act of
selfdefense only in response to an attack she had provoked, the
second of the instructions explained that "no person can unintentionally do an intentional act." The court also read an instruction
-

54. Ibid, 48.
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proposed by the defense that described the right to "oppose force
by force" as "founded upon the law of nature" and "as old as our
system of law." 55
Finally, and most significantly, the jury instructions propounded by the defense put Harwell's actions at the center of any deliberations about Wright's guilt or innocence. If Wright took her seat
in the section of the car reserved for "negro passengers," they were
told, and did so in a 'quiet and orderly manner, the court instructs
you that she was acting within her rights." The restriction of black
passengers to the back section of a streetcar had become a "right"
to occupy segregated space. The violation of such a right, then,
would make Harwell's action at least socially transgressive. If he
was in the section for black passengers, the court explained, "then
the said Pierce-Harwell was where he had no business to be," and
an attempt to push Wright out of a seat would mean that "he was
the aggressor." In short, the judge concluded, "It is the duty of
white people to sit in their own department, and it is the duty of
the negroes to sit in their department, and even if this negro
woman sit down by this white man under those conditions, it
would give him no right to shove her out of the seat."56
Segregation had been discursively molded into an equal obligation
upon, and an equal burden to, white and black citizens; whites had
a duty to submit to segregation. The court ascended on the rhetorical stage to the position of a neutral arbiter, a white judge and
twelve white jurors tasked with the responsibility to protect a black
woman from a white man who had trespassed upon her right to a
segregated seating area.57
Presented with a hopelessly muddled series of arguments, the
jury deliberated briefly before finding Wright guilty of a lesser
crime, assault with intent to commit murder in the second
degree.58Graham sentenced Wright to one year at hard labor in
state prison, and denied a motion from her lawyers for a new
trial.59 Notified by the defense that they planned an appeal,

.

I

-$d
-

55. Ibid, 49-61. Quotes are from 51,55, and 57.
56. Ibid, 9 and 61.
57. While racial obligation forms the text of this argument, gender arguments
form the subtext. As later appellate argument will show, participants in the
trial also saw Harwell as a man who hit a woman.
. WTight v. State, "Transcriptof Record,"61.
59. Ibid, 61-3. Wright signed the motion with her mark. See page 72 for the sen$: &g&&Jg
tence.
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Graham released her from custody "pending the final disposition"
of the case.60Hattie Wright had been convicted of a felony, sentenced to prison, and sent home.
The following year, the codict between white lawyers over the
meaning of Wright's actions moved to the state level, in an
exchange of legal briefs between her defense counsel and the
Attorney General's office. Here the identity of Wright's lawyers
becomes especially relevant, and the legal world of the period is
illuminated.
I have avoided naming Wright's lawyer or lawyers up to this
point, and it is difficult to do so with certainty. While the trial transcript, legal briefs, and several news stories identtfy the law firm
that defended Wright, the Tampa firm of Macfarlane &
Macfarlane, the lawyer handling the case is identified throughout
all of these documents only as "Mr. Macfarlane." There were, obviously, two lawyers named Mr. Macfarlane at that firm.
Whichever Macfarlane took the lead in Hattie Wright's
defense, however, the presence of the Macfarlane name significantly changes the social gravity of her defense. While the prosecutor who brought charges against Wright was a future Tampa
mayor, Macfarlane & Macfarlane founder Hugh C. Macfarlane was
in 1919 one of the most formidable men in the state, a former
Tampa city attorney and the founder of the then-independent City
of West Tampa? Hugh Macfarlane was also a transplanted southerner arguing for southern customs. He was born in Scotland in
1850 and admitted to the bar in Massachusetts after studying law at
Boston University in the 1870s. His son, Howard P. Macfarlane, was
educated at Princeton and the law school at Washington & Lee
University before joining his father's practice in 1924. Howard
Macfarlane was West Tampa's city attorney fiom 1913 to 1925, and
served as an infantry lieutenant during World War I.62 It appears
that Howard was not the other Macfarlane in the family firm

60. Ibid, 68.
61. Karl H. Grisrner, A History of the City of Tampa and the Tampa B q Re@
of
f b d a (St. Petersburg: The St. Petersburg Printing Company, 1950), W 1 .
In 1919 and 1920, Hugh Madk-lane was also the superintendent of public
works for the City of West Tampa. See the l i t of public officials in Armando
Mendez, C i d de Cigars: West Tampa (Cocoa: Florida Historical Society,
1994), 188-89.
62. B m h and Bar of Fhidu: A Pictorial and Biographical Directmy of the Mem.ben of the
Bench and Bar of Hmida, Vol. 1 (Tallahassee:Horace Evans, 1935), 118.
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during Wright's trial and appeal, as he was at the time-in addition to being West Tampa's city attorney-a partner in the law firm
of Macfarlane and ~ e t t i n ~ i l The
l . ~ ~other Macfarlane in
Macfarlane & Macfarlane was almost certainly Matthew B.
Macfarlane, Hugh Macfarlane's brother. Tying the relationships
together, Matthew Macfarlane was the former law partner of
Hattie Wright's prosecutor, R.E.L. Chancey, while the Pettingill in
Howard Macfarlane's law firm of Macfarlane and Pettingill had
also been the law partner of Howard's father, ~ u g hIn. a
~ small
legal community built around overlapping roles and relationships,
the prosecutor had practiced law with one of the defense lawyers.
Moreover, in the same month that Wright was on trial, the Tampa
Morning T*ne
reported that the family of a murder victim had
hired Macfiu-lane& Machrlane to assist Chancey with the prosecution of the alleged murderer? Wright's prosecutor and defense
lawyer were simultaneously on opposing sides and the same side.
While no records show how Macfarlane & Macfarlane came to
represent Wright, or describe their personal views on Wright's
defense, their involvement gave her the most influential advocates
she could have hoped to obtain.66 It also provided her with conservative representatives, men who were well settled at the center
of their local community and the state's legal community. In addition to being a former city attorney, Hugh Macfarlane was a
63. Grismer, A Hisby of the City of Tawzpu and the Tam* Bay Regeotz oflibnidq 341.
64. Ibid, 340,196.
65. "Chancey Takes Action against J.B. Figueredo," M m i n g T h m , 29 October
1919, 5.
66. Two avenues of research have proven futile in my attempt to answer this question. First, the successor firm to Madkrlane & Macfarlane remains a part of
Tampa's legal landscape, under a different name. In private correspondence
with lawyers at that firm, I have learned that it does not have records from its
predecessor firm for the year 1919. Second, the extensive files of the NAACP,
and what was at the time its Tampa branch, contain no reference to Hattie
Wright or Madarlane & Macfarlane. Those files are available at the Library of
Congress. Wright's case is also unmentioned in the pages of The Crisis. I suspect that Wright, as a laundress, was more likely to have obtained the legal
assistance of prominent white lawyers through the intercession of a prominent white client, but I have found no evidence that resolves the question.
Recent scholarship suggests the possibility that the NAACP would have
looked upon Wright and her case with deep distaste, due to class issues and
that organization's view on violence. Though Timothy Tyson writes about a
later period, his book about Robert F. Williams speaks to these organizational characteristics; see his Radio Ree Dixie: RobertI? WiEliams and the Roots of Black
Power (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999).
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Shriner and an Elk, and would go on to serve on the Grievance
~ ' significantly, Hugh Macfarlane
Committee of the State ~ a r . Most
was substantially invested in local stability, having built his personal fortune through investments in land and the development of
the local cigar industry? Macfarlane and other local boosters had
sold cigar makers on greater Tampa as a respite from labor strife
in other centers of cigar production, and the continuing prosperity of the local economy depended on peace and order. This concern for calm would have been especially strong after a disastrous
series of events in 1918: a skweek labor strike in the spring, an
enormous fire in West Tampa on April 8, and local manifestations
of a deadly flu epidemic toward the end of the year.69What's more,
the elder Macfarlane would have had a special concern for the
preservation of order on the local streetcars, some of which
crossed land he had donated for the streetcar right-of-way.70Hugh
Macfarlane had amply demonstrated his view of attacks on local
stability with his response to a massive labor strike by cigar makers
in 1910. After a shot fired from a crowd of strikers killed a cigar
company bookkeeper, he led an armed mob in a raid on the local
.Labor Temple, "driving workers out of it, smashing chairs, tables,
and other furniture, and seizing all the union's records and
papers.
The Macfarlane family and the law firm of Macfarlane &
Macfarlane were not opposed to the social, political, economic,
and legal establishment; they were at the center of that establishment, heavily invested in a kind of social stability that could not
accommodate Pierce Hamell's transgressions of racial boundaries
and the resulting violence. It is not unreasonable to speculate that
67. Bench and Bar of Rmkk, 118. Regarding Hugh Macfarlane's service on the
Grievance Committee, see the W State Bar Lau AssociationJournal, Vol. 1,
No. 1 (Aug.,1927), 12. The same issue lists R.E.L. Chancey as president ofthe
Hillsborough County Bar Association; see page 14. Regarding Howard
Macfarlane's publication in the state bar law journal, see his article, "How
Evidence of Truth or Falsity of Communications Which Affect Defendant's
Mental Condition May be Rebutted," in Vol. 1, No. 4 (Nov., 1927), 810.
68. Many sources describe Hugh Macfarlane's role as a local developer and businessman. See Mendez, C i d de Cigars, especially chapters one and two; page
four includes a brief discussion of the Macfarlane Investment Company.
69. Ibid, 132-33.
70. Ibid, 39.
71. Gene M. Burnett, H o d u 3 Past: Pmpk & Events ThaE Shaped the St&, Vol. 1
(Sarasom Pineapple Press, 1986), 235-39. The incident involving Macfarlane
amears on 239.
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Hugh Macfarlane was personally offended or threatened by
Harwell's disorderly behavior.72Still, this context of multiethnic
labor unrest and an elite yearning for order to protect commercial
interests remains no more than a subtext in the available record,
probably present but never directly in evidence.
The appellate brief Macfarlane & Macfarlane filed with the
Supreme Court perfectly reflects a conservative, rules-based, paternalistic form of socially elite white supremacy. While the twentythree page document examines in detail the laws regarding
sewdefense and assault with intent to murder, and carefully
addresses the prosecutor's mangling of that law in his closing statement, the social heart of the brief is an argument about racial characteristics and the duties of white men. "In our state white men
make the law-and enforce the law," the lawyers wrote. "It is emiit is equally right and
nently right and proper that they do so,
proper that the rights of the weak, the poor, the lowly, the negro,
should be protected by the white man." Blacks are punished for
racial transgressions, the brief argues, but whites should face the
same burden of punishment. The remarkable language of the argument is all the more striking given that it appears in a legal document focused on events from the summer of 1919: "If a white man
oversteps the bounds and through pride of race attempts oppression and imposition, he should also be dealt with-that is the obligation which the stronger race owes to the weaker."73While the
trial had turned on a right for black passengers to enjoy a segregated compartment, the defendant's appeal in the case asserted a legal
duty for the courts to intervene if' whites attempted @frw.ssion against
blacks in Jim Crow Florida. Two pages later, the brief returned to
the same theme. "Fair dealing and justice demand that when a
white man goes out of his way to bully and oppress the negro, that
the negro be afforded the same privilege of self-protection afforded the white man. In the eyes of the law he has it."74Racial boundprotect black citizens fiom white oppression.
'I

I

2

An obvious question would be whether or not Hugh Macfarlane, or any of the
Macfarlanes, would have viewed Pierce Harwell through the lens of social and
economic class. I have found nothing in the trial records or news reports that
would support an analysis based on social and economic class, which is not to
say that no such dynamic was at work.
73. Macfarlane and MacEarlane, "Brief of Plaintiff in Error,"Feb. 27, 1920, Wright
v. State, 9. This brief may be found in the same box and He as the "Transcript
of Record" for the case in the Florida State Archives (Series 49, Box 3086).
74. Ibid, 11.
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In a few short paragraphs, Macfarlane & Macfarlane had
reconstructed the history of the Red Summer: In some aberrant
instances, whites have overstepped their bounds and attempted to
oppress blacks, but the law stands as a stable barrier to their success. Revising history, they revise the subject of that history. The
Jim Crow regime is premised on mutuality, shared restraint, and
the discipline of duty; it is not oppressive, but is instead a reasoned
system for creating order. It is, in short, a system that mirrors masculine virtues, and requires sturdy commitment from its keepers.
Gender values underlie racial obligations.
These assumptions about gender become very clear in the
same document Arguing for a view of events premised on racial
roles and boundaries, Macfarlane & Macfarlane returned to the
reversal of behaviors they had identified in the trial court. Pierce
Harwell had taken up a pair of seats in a section of a streetcar
reserved for black passengers, they wrote. "He had carried this
insistence to the point of committing an assault and battery upon
a woman, who, although her skin was black, had conducted herself
with more dignity and regard for the rights of others than he had,
who had every right to be where she was while he was where he had
no right to be."75Wright's lawyers then directed an acid remark at
Harwell's manly sturdiness: "It would have been well for all concerned had his delicacy of taste as to association with negroes kept
him out of the negro section of the car. Since it did not, he was in
no situation to manifest his fastidiousness upon this question."76A
bully and a racial trespasser, Harwell was delicate and fastidious; he
was womanly, lashing out in weakness against an actual woman
who, "although her skin was black," had a superior reserve of dignity and judgment. This argument was no longer about the law.
Harwell had failed as a white man, in both elements of that identity. He had unmanned himself with poor racial discipline.
The Attorney General's office responded with a brief that
walked the same ground, as they argued the legal points but also
took up the topic of the white man's responsibility. To believe that
Wright's guilty verdict was the product of racial prejudice, wrote
Attorney General Van C. Swearingen and Assistant Attorney
General D. Stuart Gillis, "would be a poor compliment to our white
citizenship.'' To bolster their position, the attorneys point to
75. bid, 9.
'76. Ibid, 11.
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commonly-held beliefs among whites that: "negroes are at this day
and time becoming more and more arrogant-arrying
chips on
their shoulders so to speak."77Locating a chip on Hattie Wright's
shoulder, the state declined to take up the question of Pierce
Harwell's delicate manhood.
The denouement is a narrative anticlimax for historians, but was
the best possible outcome for Wright Like Macfiwlane & Machrlane,
the justice who authored the court's opinion, Chief Justice Jefferson
Beale Browne, embodied the social and procedural conservatism of
prominent men. A former federal marshal, federal court clerk, member of the Florida House of Representatives, state senator and Senate
president, Key West postmaster, collector of customs, chairman of the
state Railroad Commission, and state bar president, Browne lived
much of his life at the highest levels of the state Democratic Party. A
fierce opponent of expansive federal power despite his many years as a
beneficky of federal patronagejobs, he warned that a strong central
government might prevent Florida fkom "keeping our white citizens
fkee fkom mixture with the &can race." Also like Hugh Macfirlane,
however, Browne was educated outside the South, earning his law
degree at the University of Iowa. And Browne, like Mahlane, had
shown a willingness to provide legal defense to people at the wrong
end of the social spectrum: In 1891, he had unsuccessfuly defended
three Cuban cigar workers accused of murder during a period of labor
unrest A judicial conservative and a stem property rights advocate,
Browne had also aligned with the reform wing of the Democratic Party
in the last decade of the nineteenth century?8
Browne's personal complexity was absent fkom the opinion he
authored in the case of Hattie Wright In a unanimous decision, the
Supreme Court reversed Wright's conviction on the narrow grounds
that the prosecutor had been permitted to improperly characterize
the law to the jury in his closing statement. Chancey, it will be
recalled, had asserted that Wright gave up the right to seEdefense by
provocatively sitting next to Harwell. The court faulted the judge for
failing to intervene. "The statements by the County Solicitor were not
proper matters of argument, and not a correct statement of the law,"
Browne wrote, in an opinionjoined by every one of thejustices. They
77. "Briefon Behalf of State,"Undated, Wright v. State, 5. This brief may be found
in the same box and file as the "Transcriptof Record" and "Brief of PlaintifF
in Error"for the case in the Florida State Archives (Series 49, Box 3086).
78. Walter M. Manley I1 and Canter Brown Jr., The S u p m Court ofFlorida, 19171972 (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2006), 31-6, quote is fiom 35.
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did not return the case to the lower court for retrialY9Hattie Wright
was, m e r c w and appropriately, free to go. And she was free to go
because of the skilled efforts of MacEarlane 8c ~acfiu-lane.~~
Despite her legal victory, Wright had also served the purposes of
a conservative legal and sodal order. Her case had provided the
stage for a performance in which prominent white defenders of the
racial status puo could present segregation as a system that served the
interests of a black citizen--so much so that the black citizen in
question had fought to protect it, earning the support of what was
notionally the stronger race. In legal discourse, racial interests coincided; there were, in Florida during the summer of 1919, no real
racial conflicts, only a few abemtional moments of thoughtless trespass. Working to overturn Wright's conviction, participants in the
criminaljustice system had defended "the weak, the poor, the lowly,
the negro," significantly linking those categories in the telling. The
performance privileged a white-runlegal and social order as fair and
just, demonstrating that "if a white man.. .attempts oppression," the
"stronger race" would step in to prevent him from succeeding. For
a case born in the Red Summer, the rhetorical coupling is extraordinary: There is a stronger race, but it is not oppressive. The legal
discourse in Hattie Wright's assault case suggests the limits of armed
selfdefense against racial oppression. It was much easier to lash out
at a Pierce Hanvell than it was to escape from a legal hall of mirrors
in which self-defensebecame self-negating. Hattie Wright sat next to
a white man, and told him to move only as a response to his own
demand. She apparently did not mind sitting next to a white man.
There is no evidence at all that she intended a defense of segregation, yet her act of assertiveness had precisely that effect.
Remembering Wright's actions, and pursuing the legal trail
that followed her arrest, we can both confirm the findings of
79. There is no record in the Supreme Court's files indicating that the court
heard oral argument in the case, and the court frequently resolved the cases
before it without hearing such argument. For a discussion of the court's system for disposing of cases in this period, and for a general discussion of the
political backgrounds of the justices, see the address given by Chief Justice
Rivers Henderson Buford to the annual meeting of the Florida State Bar in
1932. The text of the address is available in the Hmidu State Bar Association Law
Journal, Vol. 6, No. 1-2 (May-June, 1932),pages 29 to 35.
80. Eight years later, the court would endorse a solution to the problem of racial
conflict on public transportation, ruling unanimously that a Daytona Beach
streetcar line for only white passengers did not represent "unjust and unreasonable discrimination between the white and negro races." See Sanders and
Tubell v. City of Daytona Beach et a1 (95 Ha. 279).
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prevailing scholarship and add another dimension to those fin&
ings. As Kelley has argued, "the study of black resistance to segregated public space remains one of the least developed areas of
inquiIy" in the examination of de~egregation.~~
Even less developed is the study of African American utilization of segregated public space as a site of respite, collective shelter, or an arena of black
control. Kelley describes activity within this arena as "congregation," writing that segregated space "gave African Americans a place
to hide, a place to plan."82Hattie Wright was a laundry worker who,
inJacqueline Jones's formulation, lacked N 1 control over her "own
productive energies and material resource^."^^ In her conflict with
Harwell, she met aggression by securing public space marked as
"colored," preventing a white intruder from seizing control of that
space. Appearing in a historiographic narrative organized around
constant white imposition of segregation and steadily emerging
black resistance to segregated space, this event forces us to consider other possibilitie~.~~
The act of fighting back took many forms.
An unfortunate corollary to this argument is that spontaneous
individual defiance, as opposed to politically coherent organized
resistance, was more easily absorbed by the multilayered legal and
social system of white supremacy. There were many overlappingJim
Crow regimes; grouped broadly under two categories, they may be
described as a brittle system of control based on direct domination
and physical brutality, and a more subtle system of control based on
law and social custom. This second system had softness, flexibility,
"give." It could absorb and incorporate resistance without breaking, turning defiant acts toward the service of the status quo. The
more brittle form generally occurred outside the aegis of the state,
while the other was found in formats derived from state power. This
pairing of opposites is complicated by the overlap between the two,
81. Kelley, Race Rebds, 56.
82. E d , 51.
83. JacquelineJones, Labor of lorre, Labor cfofSorr: Black W m , Wmk a d thaFamdj,
_Fom S h e g to the A-esent (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 7. This is not to say
that Wright would have lacked any control over her productive energies. As
Nancy Hewitt has shown, African American women in Tampa had by the early
twentieth century asserted considerable autonomy as laborers, particularly
demanding the right to "live out."See Hewitt's Southern Discmfart, 148.
84. Also useful in any discussion about black control of segregated space are the
instances, described by e l l e y in his "Congested Terrainnchapter, in which
black passengers moved the color boards on Birmingham buses to claim
more space from whites while remaining within the boundaries of segregation. See Kelley, Race Rebels, 60-1.
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as prominent advocates of law and order often led acts of mob violence. The significance of the later Civil Rights Movement is not
that it was new; the significance of the later Civil Rights Movement
is that it was the culmination of a long act of organization.
The bitter irony of the Jim Crow era is that white authorities
sometimes embraced armed black resistance and self-defense when
that choice paradoxically served the premises of white supremacy.
By the performance of legal process, ad hoe acts of individual selfassertion and selfdefense by African Americans could be bent to
the s e ~ c of
e racial segregation and white power. This argument
reflects the ability of an oppressive system to distort and redirect
opposition, using the strength of that opposition for its own purpos
es. In this sense, the system of Jim Crow could paradoxically rely
upon the actions of its victims, who could themselves reinforce segregationist customs even in the act of challenging racist violence. In
some contexts, then, self-assertion may become self-negating;
embraced and recoded by hegemonic state systems, attacks on
oppression by the oppressed may reinforce oppression.85
85. There is promising material for future research on these questions, as the
Florida Supreme Court heard a number of other cases in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries in which black defendants appealed convictions
that followed exchanges of violence with white men. In a March, 1918,for exarnple, the court considered a confrontation in which a black defendant named
E m Presley shot and killed a white deputy sheriff. A white witness, D.G.
Nelson, testified that Presley had approached h i and the deputy with a gun in
his hand, and then began to fire as the deputy reached into a pocket for his own
gun. But a doctor testified that Presley had a gunshot wound that entered the
inside of his wrist and exited at the bottom of his little finger. He had, in other
words, been shot with his hands in the air. While we have the court's opinion in
the case, I have been unable to locate the case file in the Florida State Archives.
Three years later, the court took up the case of Will Tillman, a black man who
shot a white sherifYs deputy through the hat, narrowly missing his head. Tillman
had been walking down a dark Manatee County road with a jug under his arm
when Deputy C.D. Blackwelder tried to wrestle the jug away, believing it contained illegal liquor. But Blackwelder had not identified himself, and T h a n ,
believing that he was being robbed, opened fire. The court overturned convictions in both cases. Finally, an important comparison can be made to the 1885
case of Enoch Carter, a black bartender convicted on a charge of murdering a
white Orlando police officer. Testimony in the case established that Officer L.D.
Beasley had repeatedly struck Carter with a club, including a vicious blow to the
head, on the pretense that he was keeping the sidewalks clear for ladies. Carter
responded by drawing a gun and shooting him. The shooting took place on
December 24; Carter was tried and convicted by January 4, 1886. AEter the
Supreme Court upheld his conviction, he was hanged a year later, in January of
1887. For the Supreme Court's opinion, see Carter-v. St& (22 Fla. 553). In the
Florida State Archives, see the case file in Series 49, Box 0767. Carter's death warrant is also available at the Florida State Archives, Series 12, Box 2.
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